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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, Rachel Luna was convicted of one count of abuse, exploitation, or
neglect of a vulnerable adult, and sentenced to two years fixed. She appeals from her judgment
of conviction, raising two issues. First, she contends the district court erred in prohibiting her
from presenting evidence to the jury regarding gifts given to her and other women by the alleged
victim in this case, and regarding checks she wrote pursuant to her power of attorney on the
alleged victim's bank account. Second, she contends the district court erred in instructing the
jury regarding the requirements for gift-giving under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act, which
was not referred to in the charging document. As a result of either or both of these errors, this
Court should vacate Ms. Luna's conviction, and remand this case to the district court for a new
trial on Count II.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Luna met Benton Merrill "Skip" Hofferber, the alleged victim in this case, in late
2014. (Tr., p.248.) 1 She was working as a bartender at the Kona Grill at the Village in Meridian
at the time; he was "a frequent patron." (Tr., p.248.) She was

. (See PSI,

p.1; Exs., p.2.) The two developed a friendship that grew over time. They enjoyed meals
together, spent the holidays together, and vacationed together. (Tr., p.249.) They were with each
other on "almost a daily basis." (Tr., p.249.)
Ms. Luna and her daughter moved in with Mr. Hofferber in December 2015, and they
acted like a family, participating in normal family activities. (Tr., pp.249-50.) Their relationship
was one of love and friendship; it was not sexual. (Tr., pp.250, 271.) Ms. Luna testified at trial
1

The transcript in this case does not include line numbers.
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that Mr. Hofferber asked her to marry him on "[m]any, many occasions" but, "I told him that
he's my friend, and that's how it's always going to stay, and I can't marry somebody for a bestfriend love, [which] is what I had for him." (Tr., p.271) Ms. Luna described herself, during the
presentence investigation process, as "Skip's best friend and his caretaker." (PSI, p.5.)
Ms. Luna lived with Mr. Hofferber until August or September 2016, when she moved
into an apartment. (Tr., pp.250-51.) She moved back in with Mr. Hofferber in October 2016,
after he suffered his first stroke. (Tr., pp.251-52.) She cared for him when she was at home, and
hired a CNA to care for him when she was at work. (Tr., p.253.)
Mr. Hofferber, who never married and has no children of his own, was always very
generous with young women, including Ms. Luna. (See R., pp.97-98.) Though the jury did not
learn of this, Mr. Hofferber bought Ms. Luna a Range Rover in November 2016, gave her a
significant amount of money, took her on lavish vacations, paid her rent, and paid for private
school for her daughter. (R., pp.97-98; PSI, pp.5, 120; Tr., p.122.) Mr. Hofferber intended for
Ms. Luna to be a joint account-holder on his personal account at the Bank of the Cascades, but
made her a power of attorney instead. (Tr., pp.131-32.) Pursuant to this power of attorney,
effective October 25, 2016 ("the bank account power of attorney"), Ms. Luna had 100 percent
control over Mr. Hofferber' s account and was able to withdraw and deposit funds, which she
treated as her own. (Tr., pp.127, 130, 270; R., pp.100.) In his Last Will and Testament, executed
on March 22, 2017, Mr. Hofferber gave his residuary estate to Ms. Luna and named her as his
personal representative. (Exs., pp.24-25.)
One of the gifts Mr. Hofferber gave to Ms. Luna was a ladies Rolex watch. Ms. Luna
testified Mr. Hofferber first mentioned in early 2016 that he wanted to give her a Rolex watch as
a gift. (Tr., pp.253-54.) She said, "Skip wanted me to have it as a gift. I told him I would never
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wear something that valuable. Asked ifl could sell it, and he said it's yours to do what you want
with it." (Tr., p.254) He ultimately gave her the watch in September 2015. (Tr., pp.253-54.)
Ms. Luna was not interested in wearing the watch, so she decided to sell it. (Exs., pp.43-46.) She
first had it appraised locally, at Hal Davis Jewelers, in October 2017. (Exs., p.39.) The jewelry
store offered her $6,000 for the watch. (Tr., pp.155, 258; Exs., p.39.) Ms. Luna did not think this
was a fair price so, at Mr. Hofferber's suggestion, she sent the watch to Watchworks, in Portland,
Oregon, on November 3, 2016. (Tr., p.257; Exs., p.41.) Alex Hofberg, the owner ofWatchworks,
held the watch on consignment for a number of months. (Tr., pp.259-60.) Ultimately, he offered
to purchase the watch from Ms. Luna for $24,000, and made payment to her in April 2017.
(Tr., pp.259-60.)
Ms. Luna and Mr. Hofferber contacted a real estate agent in October 2016 about selling
Mr. Hofferber's house in Garden City, Idaho, and they put the house on the market in December
2016. (Tr., p.263.) They accepted an offer on the house in February 2017, with closing scheduled
for May 1, 2017. (Tr., p.264.) Unfortunately, Mr. Hofferber suffered a serious stroke in April
2017, and was admitted to St. Luke's Hospital. (Tr., p.153.) At the request of the title company,
Ms. Luna contacted the hospital to ensure the closing could go forward notwithstanding
Mr. Hofferber's hospitalization. (Tr., p.267.) Mr. Hofferber's treating physician executed a letter
stating Mr. Hofferber is "critically ill and unable to make decisions at this time. (Exs., p.2.) As a
result of this letter, a durable springing power of attorney, which had been drafted on March 22,
2017 ("the springing power of attorney"), took effect on April 17, 2017. (Exs., pp.3-9.) The
springing power of attorney did not provide Ms. Luna with the ability to give gifts on
Mr. Hofferber's behalf (See Exs., p.5.)
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Based on her authority under the springing power of attorney, Ms. Luna closed on the
sale of Mr. Hofferber's house, and $92,000 was transferred into Mr. Hofferber's bank account,
which was the account subject to the bank account power of attorney. (Tr., p.172; Exs., p.14.)
Ms. Luna took $60,000 from the proceeds of the sale for her own use. (Tr., p.172; Exs., p.14.)
The detective involved in investigating Ms. Luna, an investigation initiated by Shauna Urzua,
who was second-in-line in Mr. Hofferber's will, testified Ms. Luna told him she had previously
agreed with Mr. Hofferber that she would use some of the proceeds from the sale of the house to
pay off two car loans and help pay her daughter's school tuition. (Tr., pp.178, 220.) Ultimately,
Ms. Luna resigned as power of attorney under the springing power of attorney on May 15, 2017.
(Tr., pp.268-69.) Ms. Urzua succeeded Ms. Luna in this role. (Tr., p.165.)
The State charged Ms. Luna by Information with two counts of abuse, exploitation, or
neglect of a vulnerable adult, in violation ofldaho Code § 18-1505(3). (R., pp.41-42.) The first
count pertained to Ms. Luna's receipt of proceeds from the sale of the Ro lex watch on April 28,
2017. (Tr., p.113.) The second count pertained to Ms. Luna's receipt of funds from the sale of
Mr. Hofferber's house on May 8, 2017. (Tr., pp.113-14.)
Idaho Code § 18-1505(3) provides that any person who exploits a vulnerable adult is
guilty of a felony if the monetary damage from the exploitation exceeds $1,000. For purposes of
this section, the word "exploitation" or "exploit" means "an action which may include, but is not
limited to, the unjust or improper use of a vulnerable adult's financial power of attorney, funds,
property or resources by another person for profit or advantage." LC. § 18-1505(4)(c). The
statute does not refer to the Uniform Power of Attorney Act, and the State did not refer to the
Uniform Power of Attorney Act in the charging document. (See I.C. § 18-1505; R., pp.41-42.)
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Just prior to trial, Ms. Luna filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of
prior gifts given by Mr. Hofferber to Ms. Luna and other women. (R., pp.96-121.) The district
court denied the motion because it was not timely filed, and stated it would rule on any
evidentiary issues at trial. (R. p.96; see also R., p.80.) At trial, the district court prohibited
Ms. Luna from presenting evidence regarding other gifts given by Mr. Hofferber to her and other
women, and from presenting evidence regarding checks she wrote pursuant to the bank account
power of attorney. (See Tr., pp.122-26, 144-47.)
The district court instructed the jury that the State had to prove Ms. Luna "exploited
[Mr. Hofferber] by taking and/or obtaining proceeds and/or money from Mr. Hofferber ... who
was at that time a vulnerable adult." (R., pp.154-55.) The district court also instructed the jury,
over objection, regarding the power of an agent to make gifts of the principal's property under
the Uniform Power of Attorney Act. The district court instructed the jury as follows:
A person (the agent) who has been given a power of attorney by another person
(the principal) may give the principal's money to others if the written power of
attorney expressly grants the power to make gifts of the principal's property.
However, the agent may not give the principal's money or other property to the
agent himself unless the written power of attorney expressly authorizes the agent
to do so.
(R., p.153.)
The jury found Ms. Luna not guilty of Count I (money from the watch), but guilty of
Count II (money from the house). (R., p.166.) The presentence investigator recommended
probation. (PSI, pp.19, 22.) Mr. Hofferber's conservator told the presentence investigator "that
Skip did not think Rachel did anything wrong." (PSI, p.3.) Counsel for Ms. Luna requested
probation, and did not object to the State's request for restitution in the amount of $60,000.
(Tr., p.340.) Ms. Luna told the district court she "had no malicious or ill intentions when
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rece1vmg the money that [she] received from Skip," and "care[d] about him very much."
(Tr., p.341.) The district court sentenced Ms. Luna to two years fixed, imposed, and ordered her
to pay $60,000 restitution. (Tr., p.344; R., p.173.) Ms. Luna filed a timely notice of appeal from
the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.177-81, 188-91.) Ms. Luna subsequently filed a motion
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 for reconsideration of sentence, which the district court
denied. (R., pp.193-95.)

6

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by prohibiting Ms. Luna from presenting evidence regarding
other gifts given by Mr. Hofferber to her and other women, and regarding checks she
wrote pursuant to her power of attorney on Mr. Hofferber's bank account?

II.

Did the district court err in instructing the jury regarding the requirements for gift-giving
under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Prohibiting Ms. Luna From Presenting Evidence Regarding Other
Gifts Given By Mr. Hofferber To Her And Other Women, And Regarding Checks She Wrote
Pursuant To Her Power Of Attorney On Mr. Hofferber' s Bank Account

A.

Introduction
The district court prohibited Ms. Luna from presenting evidence regarding other gifts

given by Mr. Hofferber to her and other women, and from presenting evidence regarding checks
she wrote pursuant to her power under the bank account power of attorney, because it concluded
this evidence was not relevant. The district court also concluded the evidence of other gifts was
inadmissible character evidence. The district court erred and abused its discretion in excluding
Ms. Luna's proffered evidence. The district court's evidentiary errors were not harmless, and
require reversal of Ms. Luna's conviction.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The question of whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while the decision to

admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661,
_, 462 P.3d 1125, 1133 (2020) (citation omitted). In considering an alleged abuse of discretion,
this Court considers "[w ]hether the trial court: ( 1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (citation omitted).

8

C.

The District Court Erred In Concluding Evidence Of Prior Gifts And Of Ms. Luna's Use
Of The Bank Account Power Of Attorney Was Not Relevant, As This Evidence Tends
To Make It More Probable That Her Receipt Of The Money At Issue In This Case Was
Neither Unjust Nor Improper
At trial, counsel for Ms. Luna sought to introduce evidence regarding checks

Mr. Hofferber gave to Kristine Orloff in 2016, and gifts he gave to Ms. Luna and other women
before he was hospitalized in April 2017. (Tr., pp.122-26.) Counsel argued these gifts were
relevant because "this is a case of an older man that gives large gifts to young women."
(Tr., p.122.) He argued the prior gifts show Mr. Hofferber intended to give Ms. Luna the money
she took from the sale of the watch and the house. (Tr., pp.122, 142.) The district court
concluded "the evidence that Mr. Hofferber gave gifts to another person or he gave gifts other
than the two transactions alleged to Ms. Luna, is simply not relevant." (Tr., p.125) In the district
court's view, "[t]he fact that someone has given gifts to someone else in the past, doesn't mean
that it is more or less likely that they gave that person a gift on any particular occasion."
(Tr., pp.125-26.)
Counsel for Ms. Luna also asked the district court to rule on whether he could present
evidence regarding transactions made by Ms. Luna pursuant to the bank account power of
attorney. (Tr., p.127.) He said:
I'd like her to be able to testify and bring in those records of her writing checks
based on [the] power of attorney over that bank account because she ultimately
did a cashier's check from that same bank account where I have no evidence that
it was ever revoked for the $60,000 cashier's check.
(Tr., p.127.) The district court responded:
What I hear you to be asking me ... is whether I think evidence in the form of
checks that Ms. Luna wrote out of some bank account belonging to Mr. Hofferber
are going to be admissible, and your argument is that he gave her the power of
attorney to do that. What relevance does the fact that she paid his water bill have
to whether or not she's entitled to the proceeds from the house?
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(Tr., p.129) Defense counsel expained:
The key is we're trying to determine his intent when he's of sound mind. He gave
her the power of attorney when he was of sound mind. It was never revoked. The
state wants to rely solely on a power of attorney that has language helpful to them,
when I've got a power of attorney that's just as valid and created at the bank by
bank employees that says she can write checks ... out of this bank account with no
evidence that it was ever revoked.
(Tr., p.129.)
The district court ruled the defense could not present evidence regarding how Ms. Luna
used her power under the bank account power of attorney, finding it was irrelevant. The district
court explained:
Certainly, the defense can present evidence that Mr. Hofferber was of sound mind
and simply gave these sums to Ms. Luna either on the date that the checks were
transmitted or on some earlier occasion .... [H]ow she exercised those powers on
other occasions, or how Mr. Hofferber gave her gifts on other occasions, is in my
view, simply not relevant. It doesn't say anything about whether these were gifts
or whether these were appropriate exercises of her powers granted to her in the
written power of attorney guidelines, and so at this point I don't think any of her
evidence of her spending his money or receiving gifts from him is relevant.
(Tr., p.132.)
The district court erred in concluding evidence of Mr. Hofferber's prior gifts to Ms. Luna
and other women and of Ms. Luna's use of the bank account power of attorney was not relevant. 2
The standard for relevance is low. Garcia, 166 Idaho at_, 462 P.3d at 1135, n.3 (2020) (citing a
secondary source for the proposition that I.R.E. 401 "requires only minimal relevance"). Rule
401 defines evidence as relevant if "(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence[,] and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the
action." Whether a fact is of consequence for purposes of I.RE. 401 "is determined by its

2

Because the district court concluded the proffered evidence was not relevant, it did not
determine whether the (in its view, non-existent) value of the probative evidence was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice within the meaning ofl.R.E. 403.

relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties." Garcia, 166 Idaho at_, 462 P.3d at
1134 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Surely the fact that Mr. Hofferber gave gifts to Ms. Luna and other women before he was
hospitalized in April 2017 is probative and material to a disputed fact of consequence in this
action-specifically, whether Ms. Luna's taking of proceeds from the sale of Mr. Hofferber's
house and the sale of the Rolex watch-was unjust or improper. As defense counsel argued in
the district court, this evidence "is crucial to show Mr. Hofferber was not 'exploited' regardless
of whether he was later deemed 'vulnerable' as this was his normal intent and regular choices."
(R., p.98.) In terms of Ms. Luna's legal theory-that she did not exploit Mr. Hofferber-the
evidence of his prior gifts and her use of the bank account power of attorney was relevant.
Ms. Luna wanted to argue to the jury that she did not exploit Mr. Hofferber because her use of
Mr. Hofferber's money was not "unjust or improper." See I.C. § 18-1505(4)(c) (defining
"exploitation" or "exploit" for purposes of section 18-1505(3)). The evidence Ms. Luna sought
to present to the jury has a tendency (and not just a minimal tendency) to make it more probable
that Ms. Luna's use of the money was neither unjust nor improper. The evidence was thus
relevant, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise.

D.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Concluding Mr. Hofferber's History Of
Giving Gifts Was Inadmissible Character Evidence
The district court also prohibited Ms. Luna from presenting evidence of Mr. Hofferber's

history of gift-giving, concluding it was inadmissible character evidence. (See Tr., p.124.) The
district court's ruling was based on the following argument from the prosecutor:
Fundamentally, the evidence that he seeks to introduce is prohibited propensity
evidence under 404(a). It does not fall in line to any exception that I can see ...
under 404(b) . . . . Counsel is not permitted by the Rules of Evidence to put on
other gifts purportedly having come from Mr. Hofferber in order to then argue
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that because he gave other gifts, he must have given this gift to Ms. Luna. That's
frankly, not - it's just ... not permissible.
(Tr., pp.124-25.) The district court agreed, stating:
If the question is, did I give my kids Christmas presents last year, or, let's say, did
I hand out candy for Halloween this year, the fact that I've handed out candy
every year for Halloween in the past says really nothing about whether I did it this

year, and so they are simply, other than to say, I'm the type of person who gives
out candy at Halloween, and, therefore, because I'm the type of person who does
that thing, I must have done it this year, and that, is in my view, character
evidence and that is what Rule 403 bars. 3
(Tr., p.126.)
The district court ruled Ms. Luna could introduce evidence of Mr. Hofferber's character
for generosity in the form of opinion or reputation evidence. (Tr., pp.143-44.) The court
explained, "Rule 404 limits specific instances of conduct, and the act of him giving Ms. Luna
other sums of money is a specific [instance] of conduct, and as I indicated before, I don't think
that's relevant to whether he gave her a gift on either of these two occasions." (Tr., p.144.)
Defense counsel argued, "I mean, if someone gave me multiple gifts ... I think it makes it more
likely that a subsequent large gift was voluntarily . . . ." (Tr., p.14 7.) The district court
responded, "Sure; I agree with that as well, but it's because that person is a generous giving
person who is the type of person who gives you gifts, and that's precisely the type of evidence
the rule precludes other than by reputation or opinion, so she can say he's a generous guy."
(Tr., p.147.)

3

Reviewing the record as a whole, it is clear the district court intended to refer to I.R.E. 404
here, not I.R.E. 403. I.R.E. 403 does not bar character evidence; instead, it provides that "[t]he
court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by" a
number of factors, including unfair prejudice. The district court had already ruled the proffered
evidence was not relevant, and thus never reached the question under I.R.E. 403 of whether the
probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
(See Tr., pp.127-32.)
12

The district court abused its discretion in concluding Mr. Hofferber's history of giving
gifts to Ms. Luna and other women was inadmissible character evidence under I.R.E. 404. Rule
404(a)(l) states that, as a general rule, "[e]vidence of a person's character or trait of character is
not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character or trait." However, I.R.E. 404(a)(2)(B) states that, as one of the exceptions to the
general rule set forth in Rule 404(a)(l), "a defendant may offer evidence of an alleged victim's
pertinent trait of character, and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to
rebut it." Mr. Hofferber was the alleged victim in this case, and Mr. Hofferber's history of being
generous with gifts (in particular, towards young women) was pertinent, or relevant, to the crime
charged because it made it more probable that Mr. Hofferber intended to give the money at issue
to Ms. Luna, a young woman, as a gift. See State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 131 (Ct. App.
2013) (citations omitted) (stating that, for purposes of I.R.E. 404(1)(2)(B), the word "pertinent"
is generally synonymous with "relevant," and "a pertinent character trait is [thus] one that is
relevant to the crime charged by making any material fact more or less probable").
The district court appeared to believe the evidence of Mr. Hofferber's gift-giving was not
admissible under I.R.E. 404(b ), but, as an initial matter, it is not even clear this section applies to
the proffered evidence. Rule 404(b) provides that "[ e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is
not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the character." Evidence of Mr. Hofferber's gift-giving is
arguably not evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act. Even if it is, it would still be admissible
under I.R.E. 404(b )(2) to prove Mr. Hofferber's intent. Rule 404(b )(2) provides that evidence of
crimes, wrongs, or other acts "may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
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accident." Mr. Hofferber's intent was critical to this case-specifically, whether Mr. Hofferber
intended to give Ms. Luna, as a gift, money from the sale of the watch and the sale ofhis house.
The district court abused its discretion in concluding specific instances of
Mr. Hofferber's gift-giving was inadmissible character evidence because it did not act
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it in reaching
its decision, and did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason. See Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at
863 (stating standard for abuse of discretion review).

E.

The District Court's Evidentiary Errors Were Not Harmless
Where, as here, a district court makes an incorrect evidentiary ruling, this Court will

grant relief if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties. State v. Jones, 167 Idaho
353, _, 470 P.3d 1162, 1174 (2020). "To establish harmless error, the State must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted). The State cannot make that showing here. The jury surely
could have found Ms. Luna not guilty if the district court had allowed her to present evidence of
other gifts given by Mr. Hofferber to her and other women, and evidence of checks she wrote
pursuant to the bank account power of attorney. As it was, the jury found Ms. Luna not guilty of
Count I, pertaining to her receipt of the proceeds from the sale of the Ro lex watch. (R., p.166;
Tr., p.113.) The jury may well have concluded Ms. Luna did not exploit Mr. Hofferber when she
took proceeds from the sale of Mr. Hofferber's house (by writing a check to herself pursuant to
the bank account power of attorney), if it had learned of Mr. Hofferber' s history of gift-giving
and of Ms. Luna's history of writing checks under the bank account power of attorney. On the
record presented, the State cannot prove the district court's evidentiary errors were harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
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II.
The District Court Erred When It Instructed The Jury Regarding The Requirements For GiftGiving Under The Uniform Power Of Attorney Act

A.

Introduction
The district court's instruction to the jury regarding the requirements for gift-giving under

the Uniform Power of Attorney Act resulted in a variance with the Information, because the
instruction did not match the allegations in the charging document as to the means by which
Ms. Luna was alleged to have committed the charged crimes. The variance is fatal because it
violated Ms. Luna's constitutional right to due process by depriving her of her right to fair notice
of the charges against her and lowering the State's burden of proof The instruction allowed the
jury to find Ms. Luna guilty of violating Idaho Code § 18-1505(3) if it found she did not act in
accordance with the Uniform Power of Attorney Act. Because this was not the crime charged in
the Information, Ms. Luna's conviction must be reversed.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The existence of an impermissible variance between a charging instrument and jury

instructions is a question of law over which we exercise free review." State v. Sherrod, 131
Idaho 56, 57 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted). Whether a jury was properly instructed is also a
question oflaw over which this Court exercises free review. See State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237,
239 (1999).

C.

The District Court's Instruction To The Jury Resulted In A Fatal Variance
"Jury instructions should match the allegations in the charging document as to the means

by which a defendant is alleged to have committed the charged crime." State v. Miller, 165 Idaho
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115, 120 (2019) (citation omitted). Failure to do so creates a variance, which is fatal when it
violates due process. Id. In determining whether a fatal variance exists, this Court must first
determine whether a variance exists, and must next determine whether the variance is fatal. See

State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 329 (Ct. App. 2001). A variance is fatal, requiring reversal of the
defendant's conviction, when it deprives the defendant of the right to fair notice or leaves him or
her open to the risk of double jeopardy. See State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 417-18 (1985);

Brazil, 136 Idaho at 330. In the present case, there was a variance between the Information and
the jury instructions, and the variance was fatal, requiring reversal of Ms. Luna's conviction,
because it deprived her of her constitutional right to due process.

1.

There Was A Variance Between The Information And The Jury Instructions

The State charged Ms. Luna with two counts of abuse, exploitation, or neglect of a
vulnerable adult, in violation ofldaho Code§ 18-1505(3). (R., pp.41-42.) The prosecutor alleged
Ms. Luna "did exploit" Mr. Hofferber, a vulnerable adult, "by taking and/or obtaining proceeds
and/or money from Mr. Hofferber, where the monetary damage ... exceeds one thousand dollars
($1,000.00)." (R., pp.41-42.) The language used in the charging document tracks the language of
section 18-1505(3), which provides that any person who exploits a vulnerable adult is guilty of a
felony if the monetary damage from the exploitation exceeds $1,000. For purposes of section 181505, the word "exploitation" or "exploit" means "an action which may include, but is not
limited to, the unjust or improper use of a vulnerable adult's financial power of attorney, funds,
property or resources by another person for profit or advantage." I.C. § 18-1505(4)(c).
The Information does not refer to the Uniform Power of Attorney Act ("the Act"), which
applies, as a default, to all powers of attorney except "[a] power to the extent it is coupled with
an interest in the subject of the power;" [a] power to make health care decisions;" "[a] proxy ...
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to exercise voting rights or management rights;" and "[a] power created on a from prescribed by
a government ... for a governmental purpose." LC. § 15-12-103. The Act provides, among other
things, that an agent that has accepted an appointment as a power of attorney "shall ... [a]ct in
accordance with the principal's reasonable expectations to the extent actually known by the
agent and, otherwise, in the principal's best interest." LC. § 15-12-114(1)(a). The Act provides
that the agent's authority to make a gift with the principal' s property must be expressly granted,
and is not unlimited. See LC. §§ 15-12-201(1)(b), 15-12-217; see also Matter of Estate of Smith,
164 Idaho 457, 472-73 (2018) (discussing gift-making authority under the Act). The Act contains
a remedy provision-it states, in pertinent part, that "[a]n agent that violates this chapter is liable
to the principal ... for the amount required to: (1) Restore the value of the principal's property
to what it would have been had the violation not occurred; and (2) Reimburse the principal ...
for the attorney's fees and costs ... paid on the agent's behalf" 4 LC. § 15-12-117.
The prosecutor submitted proposed jury instructions to the district court, which asked the
jury to determine whether Ms. Luna "exploited" Mr. Hofferber, and whether "the monetary
damage from the exploitation exceeded one thousand dollars ($1,000)." (R., p.89.) The State
proposed that the jury be instructed on the meaning of "exploit" as defined in the statute.
(R., p.90.) The State did not propose that the jury be instructed regarding the power of agents to
give gifts under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act. (See R., pp.87-90.) The State's proposed
instruction was consistent with the pattern jury instruction for felony exploitation of a vulnerable
adult, which does not refer to the Uniform Power of Attorney Act. See ICJI 1293.

4

Notably, Ms. Luna did not object to the State's request for restitution in the amount of $60,000,
which would be the remedy available for a violation of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act.
(Tr., p.340.)
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At a break during trial, the district court asked the parties, "Are there going to be requests
that I give the jury instruction on the Uniform Power of Attorney Act." (Tr., p.240.) The
prosecutor responded, "I'm going to request the court give an instruction consistent with what
the court articulated earlier in our motion debate, essentially, the default is that there is not a
power to give gifts unless it's specifically designated." (Tr., p.240.) The district court asked
defense counsel whether he "knew what portion of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act he's
talking about." (Tr., p.240.) Defense counsel responded regarding the bank account power of
attorney. (Tr., pp.240-41.) The district court said:
Well, I'm not talking about objections based on the Parole Evidence Rule. If
we're going to interpret a document. My question was, he's asking me to give an
instruction that's essentially a recitation of a portion of the Uniform Power of
Attorney Act. I know you haven't seen that because he didn't prepare it, but do
you know enough about what he's asking me to talk about that now, or do you
want to see it before you talk about it?
(Tr., p.241.) Defense counsel responded that he would have to see it first. (Tr., p.241.) The
prosecutor said he would "submit it tonight." (Tr., p.241.) The prosecutor did not submit any
additional instructions to the district court. (See generally R., pp.6-7.)
On its own initiative, the district court drafted the following jury instruction regarding the
power of an agent to give gifts under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act:
A person (the agent) who has been given a power of attorney by another person
(the principal) may give the principal's money to others if the written power of
attorney expressly grants the power to make gifts of the principal's property.
However, the agent may not give the principal's money or other property to the
agent himself unless the written power of attorney expressly authorizes the agent
to do so.
(R., p.15 3.) At the jury instruction conference, defense counsel asked, referring to this
instruction, "where does that come from?" The district court responded, "It's the paraphrasing of
the Uniform Power of Attorney Act." (Tr., pp.292-93.) Defense counsel objected to this
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instruction because the language was from a civil code, not a criminal code. (See Tr., p.293.) The
district court overruled the objection. (Tr., p.294.) The following exchange then took place:
THE COURT:

I don't know that-the law's the law, Mr. Barrera. Do you
have some authority that the law doesn't apply in criminal
cases?

MR. BARRERA:

Well, Judge, I mean, uniform probate code doesn't talk
about any . . . remedies at all. It never even addresses
criminal remedies or criminal sanctions.

THE COURT:

I agree that the legislature has not made-well, they don't
define any crimes in the Uniform Power of Attorney Act.
Do you contend that's not a correct statement of the law?

MR. BARRERA:

This instruction effectively creates its own crime. You're
taking a civil prohibition and turning it into a crime.

THE COURT:

Idaho Code 18-1505 defines abuse of vulnerable adult to
include misuse of the vulnerable adult's power of attorney,
so when the jury has to interpret what misuse is, doesn't it
make sense that they understand the lawful use of power of
attorney under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act?

MR. BARRERA:

Judge, I'll just renew my objection and move on.

THE COURT:

Those objections are overruled.

(Tr., pp.294-95.) The district court provided the instruction it created from the Uniform Power of
Attorney Act to the jury. (R., p.153.)
The district court's instruction created a variance, as the State did not charge Ms. Luna
with violating Idaho Code § 18-1505(3) by giving a gift to herself, as an agent from a principal,
in contravention of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act. Instead, the State charged Ms. Luna
with violating section 18-1505(3) by exploiting Mr. Hofferber, a vulnerable adult, by taking from
him money in excess of $1,000. (R., pp.41-42.) Defense counsel argued in the district court that
the instruction "effectively creates its own crime" by "taking a civil prohibition and turning it
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into a crime." (Tr., p.294.) This was not the crime charged in the Information, and the instruction
thus created a variance.

2.

The Variance Was Fatal

The variance was fatal because it deprived Ms. Luna of her constitutional right to due
process. An erroneous jury instruction violates due process if it omits a contested element of a
crime or if it relieves the State of the burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588 (2011). Here, the district court's
instruction lowered the State's burden of proof and deprived Ms. Luna of fair notice of the
charges against her.
The critical question in this case was not whether Mr. Hofferber was a vulnerable adult,
or whether Ms. Luna took over $1,000 from Mr. Hofferber. These facts were not disputed. The
critical question was whether Ms. Luna exploited Mr. Hofferber, her self-described best friend,
when she took the money at issue from the proceeds of the sale of Mr. Hofferber's house and the
Rolex watch. (PSI, p.5; see also R., p.97.) The district court's instruction allowed the jury to fmd
Ms. Luna exploited Mr. Hofferber simply because she did not comply with the requirements for
gift-giving set forth in the Uniform Power of Attorney Act. This lowered the State's burden of
proving the essential element of exploitation.
The jury instruction also violated Ms. Luna's constitutional right to due process because
it deprived her of fair notice of the charges against her. Up until the jury instruction conference,
Ms. Luna believed she could defend against the charges against her by showing she did not
exploit Mr. Hofferber within the meaning of section 18-1505, because her use of the springing
power of attorney, and her acceptance of money from the sale of the house and the watch, were
neither unjust nor improper. See I.C. § 18-1505(4)(c) (defming "exploit" to mean "an action
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which may include, but is not limited to, the unjust or improper use of a vulnerable adult's
financial power of attorney, funds, property or resources by another person for profit or
advantage").
However, the district court's instruction to the jury meant she had to defend her actions as
proper under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act. It appears from the transcript that defense
counsel was not even aware of the requirements for gift-giving contained in the Act prior to the
jury instruction conference. Defense counsel told the district court he would have to see the
proposed instruction before commenting on it, and then asked the court where the language of
the proposed instruction "come[s] from." (Tr., pp.241, 292-93.) Defense counsel objected to the
proposed instruction on the grounds that it "tak[es] a civil prohibition and turn[s] it into a crime."
(Tr., pp.294-95.) Defense counsel had it exactly right. The instruction essentially charged
Ms. Luna with a new crime, about which she did not have fair notice.
The Idaho Supreme Court found a fatal variance existed in State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327
(2018), when the district court's instruction to the jury permitted it to find the defendant guilty of
a crime not charged in the information. The State charged the defendant with lewd conduct by
committing oral-to-genital contact with a child, but the district court instructed the jury that it
could fmd the defendant guilty if he committed any form of lewd and lascivious conduct,
including "oral-genital contact, genital-genital contact, genital-anal contact, manual-genital
contact, manual-anal contact, oral-anal contact, etc." Id. at 339-40. The Court held the instruction
was erroneous because "a valid conviction could be based only upon a fmding beyond a
reasonable doubt that Defendant engaged in an act of oral-genital contact." Id. at 340. The Court
explained:
In this case, Defendant was charged with lewd conduct by committing oral-genital
contact upon Child. The instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the
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charging document as to the means by which a defendant is alleged to have
committed the crime charged. Otherwise, there can be a fatal variance between
the jury instructions and the charging document. Also, the jury instruction must
not permit the defendant to be convicted of conduct that does not constitute the
type of crime charged.

Id. at 342.
The variance here is similar to the variance in Folk, in that it allowed the jury to convict
Ms. Luna based on conduct not charged in the Information. The proper remedy for the variance
that occurred here, as in Folk, is to vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case to the
district court for a new trial on Count II. See Folk, 151 Idaho at 342.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Luna respectfully requests that the Court vacate her conviction, and remand this case
to the district court for further proceedings.
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